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 1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a worldwide phenomena.1 It alters the e⁄ective tax rate, and
this can change the growth e⁄ect of taxes, such as that found in Stokey and
Rebelo (1995). And across the whole range of tax rates, tax evasion can
cause an entirely di⁄erent pro￿le of the e⁄ect of taxes on growth.
The pro￿le of the e⁄ect of taxes on growth is not well-known. Will de-
creasing tax rates have the same marginal e⁄ect on growth no matter what
the level of tax rates? This can be important, for example since US tax
rates have varied signi￿cantly, with the top marginal personal income tax
rate falling from 92% in 1952 down to 35% in 2008, and with top bracket
corporate tax rates falling over the same period from 52% to 35%. And
this postwar downward tax rate trend has been seen internationally to a sig-
ni￿cant degree, such as with low ￿ at tax rate regimes arising across "New"
Europe and Russia. Endogenous growth theory predicts that such signi￿cant
decreases in the average tax rates should have signi￿cant e⁄ects on growth
in the long run; but does the growth e⁄ect di⁄er according to the level from
which taxes are decreased?
Using the ￿ at-tax approach of Stokey and Rebelo (1995) as an abstrac-
tion, this paper shows in standard endogenous growth economies that the
e⁄ect of ￿ at taxes on growth can be linear, or almost linear, with similar
marginal e⁄ects on the balanced path growth rate, of either capital or labor
tax changes, regardless of the level of the taxes. Such near linearity may not
be realistic. It would imply that as tax rates rise, growth rates fall steadily
and even become negative at some point. In contrast, the tax-growth pro-
￿le evidence for the in￿ ation tax implies that the growth rate decreases by
increasingly less as the in￿ ation tax rises(Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004).
The in￿ ation tax literature shows that including a means of avoiding the
in￿ ation tax, through credit that is produced in a banking sector, changes
the pro￿le of the e⁄ect of the tax on growth from a nearly linear one to a
more nonlinear one (Gillman and Kejak 2005). Applying this same banking
1One associated measure is the size of the underground economy, on which Schneider
and Enste (2000) has focused.
1approach, this paper allows for a competitive equilibrium evasion (rather than
avoidance) of capital, labor, and value-added goods taxes, again through a
banking sector.2 This produces a signi￿cantly non-linear pro￿le of the e⁄ect
of taxes on growth that would appear to be more plausible than the pro￿le
without evasion.
In allowing for evasion, the paper also presents a principle of public ￿nance
and growth. The principle is simple: the higher the tax rate, the greater the
substitution towards evasion activity, and the higher is the price elasticity
of demand for declared income. As the tax rate is increasingly evaded, its
burden on the economic growth rate is increasingly less. Conversely, as tax
rates are lowered and the taxes are increasingly less evaded, then the marginal
positive e⁄ect of the tax reduction on growth is increasingly bigger. This may
be good growth news for the tax reduction trend seen internationally.
Here, as with in￿ ation tax avoidance, we model tax evasion so that it
makes the e⁄ective tax rate less than the statutory rate. As the tax rate
increases, the e⁄ective tax rate increases; but because of evasion the e⁄ective
tax rate increases by an increasingly lesser amount. Since the growth rate
falls as the e⁄ective tax rate increases, the result is that the growth rate falls
by a smaller amount as the tax rises. The lesser fall in the growth rate from
tax rate increases, and its explanation in terms of the rising price elasticity of
demand for the taxed good, is a plausible principle of ￿scal ￿nance that holds
with tax evasion or avoidance within classes of endogenous growth economies.
The paper ￿rst sets out the simplest economy that exhibits the principle
at work. In a physical-capital-only, Ak economy, a decentralized banking
sector is set up that provides a tax evasion service that enables the repre-
sentative agent to report only a fraction of capital income to the government
tax authority, while laundering the remaining of the capital income back into
regular income through the banking system. The result is that an increase
in the tax rate on capital income causes the growth rate to change in propor-
tional to the fraction of income that the consumer reports to the government.
2Banking is the typical vehicle for tax evasion in practice. For example, the bank
UBS was reported to be complicit in provide tax evasion services for clients (Mollenkamp,
Simpson, and Frangos 2008). Lichtenstein banks were recently reported to be a conduit
for international tax evasion (Dougherty 2008).
2Because this fraction of reported income declines as the tax rate increases,
the marginal decrease in growth becomes smaller as the tax rate increases.
At the same time, the price elasticity of demand of the consumer for the
reported income increases.
The model is then extended to have both human and physical capital.
The e⁄ect of a capital tax change on growth in this case now comprises the
tax evasion term of the Ak model, plus the standard Stokey and Rebelo
(1995) tax e⁄ect on the return to capital. Next the tax evasion result on
growth is shown for the labor tax. An Ah economy is presented with only
human capital, with a resulting lesser magnitude of the tax￿ s growth rate
e⁄ect. This is rather more complicated than for the capital tax because the
labor tax works on growth through its e⁄ect on leisure, and on the return
to human capital, rather than directly taxing the return to physical capital.
Both the labor and capital taxes with evasion are then both set within the
full economy with human and physical capital, and a consumption tax (VAT)
is also added. Similar results of the e⁄ect of all three taxes on growth with
evasion are presented, along with comparison to the in￿ ation tax, as based
on an increasing price sensitivity to the tax.
2 The Ak Economy with Tax Evasion
The representative consumer owns the goods producer, who has a production
function that is linear in only physical capital, and the consumer invests in
capital and earns capital income by renting it to the goods producer. There
is also a separate bank sector owned by the consumer that produces the tax
evasion service that enables the consumer to report only a fraction of the
capital rental income received from the goods ￿rm.
The representative consumer utility is a function only of consumption
goods, ct; assuming a log form, and given an initial capital stock k0; the






Physical capital kt is allocated between goods production and banking pro-
3duction, with the share of capital going to goods denoted by sGt; and to
banking production by skt; the shares add to one:
sGt + skt = 1: (2)
Investment it of capital, with a depreciation rate of ￿k; allows capital to be
accumulated over time:
_ kt = it ￿ ￿Kkt; (3)
and is simply allocated out of goods output yt without additional adjustment
costs, so that
_ kt = yt ￿ ct ￿ ￿Kkt: (4)
With the real interest rate denoted by rt; the agent earns capital income
from the two sectors equal to rtkt (sGt + skt); which is the same as rtkt:
However there is a tax on capital income at the rate of ￿k; on income that
is reported to the government. To avoid paying taxes on some fraction of
the capital income, with this fraction denoted by akt 2 [0;1]; the agent pays
for the tax evasion service at a competitively determined market price. This
price, denoted by pkt; is per unit of tax evasion services, denoted by ￿t:
As a Leontie⁄ one-to-one technology is assumed in the bank sector be-
tween the quantity of tax evasion services and the amount of income that is
"laundered" by the bank (and so evades taxes), the quantity demanded of
tax evasion services will be equal to the quantity demand of unreported, or
"undeclared," income. 3 This means that the total income on which taxes
are paid is equal to aktrtkt; net of tax income this is (1 ￿ ￿k)aktrtkt. The
value of the rest of the income, that is laundered by the bank for a fee so that
3The demand for tax evasion services can be framed more formally within a Becker
(1965) household production function. Speci￿cally, let the consumer produce the con-
sumption of goods by combining inputs of the purchased goods, and the income necessary
to purchase the goods. This is a Beckerian Leontie⁄ technology whereby the value of the
goods and the amount of the income are in a one-to-one ratio. Second, the income itself
is also household produced through the combination of either of two perfect substitutes:
reported income or unreported income. The production of the unreported income is the
result of combining the quantity of tax evasion banking services with the same quantity
of real income, in a Leontie⁄ one-to-one fashion. This set-up is parallel to that of Gillman
and Kejak (2005) for credit services.
4no taxes are paid on this fraction of income, is equal to ￿kt = (1 ￿ akt)rtkt;
net of the tax evasion fee this income equals (1 ￿ pkt)(1 ￿ akt)rtkt.
The consumer also receives income from a government transfer, denoted
by vt (equal to tax proceeds) and from a dividend due to ownership of the
bank. The dividend comes because the consumer buys a share in the bank
with each dollar deposited in the bank, as with mutual bank charters. The
price of each share is ￿xed at one. There is no capital gain, but instead
the pro￿ts are distributed in proportion to the deposits (or shares) held, so
that after distribution of the dividends the bank has zero remaining pro￿t.
Denote the dividend rate per deposit as rkt; and the quantity of deposits
as dkt: Then the total dividend income is rktdkt: This makes the consumer￿ s
budget constraint, written in terms of equation (4), as
_ kt = (1 ￿ ￿k)aktrtkt + (1 ￿ pkt)(1 ￿ akt)rtkt + rktdkt
￿ct + vt ￿ ￿Kkt: (5)
The consumer deposits all capital income in the bank, so that
rtkt = dkt: (6)
2.1 Goods Producer Problem
Production of goods output, yt; uses a linear technology in capital, sGtkt;
yt = AGsGtkt; (7)
with AG > 0: The ￿rm, takes the prices of capital services, rt; as given, and
maximizes pro￿t by choosing capital inputs
max
fsGtktg
￿Gt = AGsGtkt ￿ rtsGtkt: (8)
This implies in equilibrium the ￿xed interest rate of
rt = AG: (9)
52.2 Bank Production Problem
Taking the price of tax evasion services pkt, the rental price of capital rt
and its production function as given, the bank maximizes its pro￿t in a
competitive fashion. Pro￿t ￿kt is de￿ned as the total revenue, being the
tax evasion fee pkt times the quantity of tax-evaded ("laundered") dollars
that are produced, where this quantity is denoted by ￿t; costs are the rental




￿kt = pkt￿kt ￿ rtsktkt ￿ rktdkt; (10)
subject to its production technology of the tax evasion service. The tax eva-
sion production function is assumed to be a CRS technology in capital, and
deposited funds (￿nancial capital) as in the ￿nancial intermediation micro-
economic industry literature of Sealey and Lindley (1977), Clark (1984) and
Hancock (1985):4
￿kt = Ak (sktkt)
!k (dt)
1￿!k ; (11)
where !k 2 (0;1): The resulting equilibrium condition is that the cost of


















Substituting the equilibrium input ratio into the production function, and










4Clark (1984) assumes that ￿nancial intermediary services are produced with a CRS
function of labor, capital, and deposited funds; here we are postulating an economy without
labor and so this factor is omitted, while maintaining the CRS assumption in the two
factors of capital and deposits.
6The amount of dollars that evade taxes is given as the fraction 1￿akt of
capital income, or (1 ￿ akt)rtkt: And this evasion service is what the bank is
producing, so that
￿kt = (1 ￿ akt)rtkt: (14)
And since the total deposits dkt is equal to the capital income rtkt; it follows
from equations (13) and (14) that







this gives the supply of the unreported income as a function of the price of
the tax evasion service pkt: It results from equating the marginal bene￿t of








and the price of the service pkt equals the marginal cost of the tax evasion







The CRS property of the production function (11), or the ￿rst-order
condition with respect to dkt; implies that the Cobb-Douglas coe¢ cient 1￿!k
is equal to the factor income rktdkt divided by the total revenue, in this case
pkt￿kt: Substituting in for ￿kt from equation (14), it follows that
1 ￿ !k =
rktdkt
pkt (1 ￿ akt)rtkt
: (17)
From equation (6), the deposits dt are equal to rtkt; with equation (17) this
implies that
rkt = pkt (1 ￿ !k)(1 ￿ akt): (18)
The dividend rate rkt is a fraction (1 ￿ !k)(1 ￿ akt) of the tax evasion price
pkt; and the fraction rises as does the supply of the tax-evaded income.
72.3 Government
The government receives tax revenues only on reported capital incomes and
pays a lump sum transfer of vt; making the government budget constraint:
akt￿krtkt = vt: (19)
2.4 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a set of allocations
fct;akt;kt;sGt;skt;dktg, a set of prices frt;pkt;rktg, the government￿ s policy
f￿k;vtg, and the initial condition k0 such that
1. given the price of capital services, rt; the banking fees, pkt; and the
returns to deposits, rkt; the consumer maximizes utility V (k0) in equa-
tion (1) with respect to ut ￿ (ct;akt;dkt) and subject to its budget
constraint (5), and to the deposit constraint (6);
2. given the price of capital, rt; the goods producing ￿rm maximizes pro￿t
￿Gt in (8), with respect to its input of capital sGtkt;
3. given the price of capital, rt; the return to deposits, rkt; and the fee
for credit services, pkt; the bank maximizes its pro￿t ￿kt in (10) with
respect to its input of capital sktkt and its input of deposits dkt;
4. the government budget (19) is always satis￿ed;
5. and all markets clear at the given prices.
The equilibrium margins from the ￿rst-order conditions are standard ex-
cept for the e⁄ect of the tax evasion, which the next proposition highlights.
Here, the existence of an interior competitive equilibrium, in which both the
tax on reported income and the fee on tax evasion services are paid, implies
the solution for the equilibrium price of the tax evasion service.
Proposition 1. The competitive equilibrium price of tax evasion services
for capital income tax evasion is equal to the tax rate;
pkt = ￿k: (20)
8Proof. This follows directly from the consumer￿ s ￿rst-order condition for
fraction of reported income, akt (not shown).
The proposition, based as far back in the literature as Becker (1968), says
that the consumer will spend on the margin an amount equal to the cost of
paying (not evading) the tax, which is the tax rate ￿k. Thus the supply of
the fraction of unreported income in equation (15) is a positive function of
the level of the tax rate;







Tax evasion output 1￿akt increases as the tax rate increases. Solving equa-
tion (21) for ￿k, and using that rt = AG from equation (9), Figure 1 graphs
the convex (!k > 0:5) upward sloping supply and the demand at ￿k = 0:3
for unreported income; with !k = 0:3; Ak = 0:6; and AG = 0:08:























Fraction of Unreported Income
Figure 1: The Supply of Unreported Income 1￿akt; and Demand at ￿k = 0:3:
The demand for unreported income (dashed line) is perfectly elastic at
the price of ￿k: However, since the unreported income and reported income
are perfect substitutes to the consumer, when ￿nding income to purchase
goods, the supply of unreported income in equation (21) also implies the
demand for reported income akt; which falls as the tax rate increases. Key to
the market for tax evasion is that it creates an e⁄ective tax rate that is less
than the actual tax rate, through the return to the consumer of the dividend
rkt from the bank supplying the tax evasion service.
9Corollary 1. The e⁄ective tax rate equals ￿k ￿ rk:
Proof. The consumer￿ s equilibrium conditions imply that the return
on capital, net of taxes and the payment of tax evasion fees, is equal to
rt [(1 ￿ ￿k)akt + (1 ￿ pkt)(1 ￿ akt) + rkt]; where rkt is given by equation (18).
The amount ￿kaktrt is paid in taxes per unit of kt; the amount pkt (1 ￿ akt)rt
is per unit the cost of tax evasion; and this cost is reduced by the dividends
on the deposits in the evasion bank, paid at the rate of rkt per dividend. This
makes the e⁄ective tax rate equal to ￿kakt+pkt (1 ￿ akt)￿rkt: By Proposition
1, this e⁄ective rate reduces to ￿k ￿ rkt:
The e⁄ective tax rate ￿k￿rkt can also be written as ￿kakt+￿k!k (1 ￿ akt);
which can be thought as a weighted average of the average cost of the tax
when reporting the income and when not reporting the income; with the
weights akt and 1￿akt; the weighted average falls as akt decreases and more
income is unreported.5 The lower e⁄ective tax as a result of tax evasion af-
fects the growth rate along the balanced-growth path, as the next proposition
states.
2.5 Balanced Growth Rate
Proposition 2. Along the balanced growth path, the growth rate is given
by
g = r(1 ￿ ￿k + rkt) ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿; (22)










where akt is given by equation (21).
Proof. By equation (18) and Proposition 1,
rkt = ￿kt (1 ￿ !k)(1 ￿ akt); (25)
5The average (before dividend) cost of the tax evasion when not reporting the income is
given by rtsktkt
￿t = ￿k!k; which is less than the average cost of ￿k when reporting income.





1￿!k by equation (21). Substituting into equation
(22) for rkt; using equation (25), gives that
g = rt [1 ￿ ￿k + ￿kt (1 ￿ !k)(1 ￿ akt)] ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿; (26)
further substituting into equation (26) for 1￿akt, and using equation (9) to














￿ ￿K ￿ ￿; (27)
taking the derivative, gives that
@g






Corollary 2. With no tax evasion, when Ak = 0; the tax linearly a⁄ects
the growth rate.
Proof. With Ak = 0; by equation (21), akt = 1; and by Proposition 2,
@g
@￿k = ￿AG:
The preceding proposition and corollary show ￿rst that the dividend re-
turn rkt makes the e⁄ective tax (￿k ￿ rkt) less than the statutory rate ￿k.
Then it is shown that the growth rate falls with the tax rate ￿k increase,
in proportion to the fraction of reported income akt. And the growth rate
falls by marginally less, as the tax rate increases and the fraction of reported
income falls. So the growth rate falls by a decreasing amount in a nonlinear
fashion, as compared to a linear decrease when there is no production of
the tax evasion service. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with the solid line
showing the nonlinear case with tax evasion, and the dashed line showing
the standard linear case with no tax evasion.6
And it follows that the more productive is the bank sector in producing
tax evasion, the smaller is the decline in the growth rate (in Figure 2, an
increase in bank productivity pivots up the solid line):
Corollary 3. An increase in bank sector productivity factor Ak causes a
decrease in the magnitude of the growth e⁄ect for any given tax rate ￿k:
6Figure 2 assumes the parameters of !k = 0:3; AG = 0:08; ￿k+￿ = 0:04; and Ak = 0:6:


















Figure 2: The E⁄ect on Growth of the Capital Tax ￿k
Proof. From Proposition 2 and equation (21),
@g


























The link between the e⁄ective tax , growth, and the price elasticity of
demand of reported income results because of the dependence of the change
in the e⁄ective tax rate on the share of reported income akt: Intuitively, a
tax rate increase causes a marginally smaller growth rate decrease because of
an increasing price elasticity of demand for reporting income relative to the
tax rate. Formally, consider the e⁄ect of the tax rate on the price elasticity,
and on the elasticity of substitution between the reported and unreported
income, in the following proposition and corollary:
Proposition 3. The price elasticity of demand for reported income with
respect to the tax rate rises in magnitude as the tax rate rises.


















12From equation (15) and Proposition 1,
@akt
@￿k < 0; and so the price elasticity
￿akt
￿k rises in magnitude as the tax rate ￿k rises.
Corollary 4. The elasticity of substitution between reported income and
unreported income rises in magnitude as the tax rate rises.








































; so that the relative price between re-












From equation (28), and equation (29) of Proposition 2, it is clear that





One of Marshall (1920) four laws of factor demands is that the elasticity
of substitution between factors equals the share of the one factor, in this
case 1 ￿ akt; factored by the price elasticity of demand for the other factor,
in this case ￿akt
￿k : Thus the tax e⁄ects on the price elasticity of demand, and
the elasticity of substitution, are both driven by the tax e⁄ect on the fraction
of reported income akt: And therefore the result that the growth rate e⁄ect
of the tax is smaller in magnitude as the tax rate rises, is synonymous with
the result that the price elasticity of demand for reported income rises in
magnitude as the tax rate increases. These e⁄ects are equally synonymous
with a rising elasticity of substitution between the reported and unreported
income.
133 The Capital Tax with Physical and Human
Capital
The economy is extended to postulate tax evasion of the capital tax but
now within an endogenous growth economy with both human and physical
capital, as in King and Rebelo (1990). It is shown that the tax evasion causes
a similar e⁄ect on growth as was shown for the Ak economy.
The banking sector will be speci￿ed to use inputs of e⁄ective labor and
deposits, instead of capital and deposits, a simpli￿cation from using all three
inputs of labor, capital and deposits. E⁄ective labor is also used in goods
production and human capital investment; physical capital is an input in
goods production and human capital production.
The representative agent utility function now depends upon both goods
ct and leisure xt; as given by
u(ct;xt) = lnct + ￿lnxt (31)
with ￿ 2 R+. One unit of time is allocated among working in goods pro-
duction, lGt, in human capital investment, lHt; in the bank sector, lkt; and as
leisure xt :
lGt + lHt + lkt + xt = 1: (32)
The share of physical capital is allocated to goods production sGt; and to
human capital production sHt :
sGt + sHt = 1: (33)
Goods and banking production are decentralized sectors from which the
agent earns labor and capital income. In order to avoid capital taxes, the
agent reports again only a fraction akt of the earned capital income.
With ht and kt denoting the human and physical capital stocks at time
t; the agent￿ s accumulation of physical and human capital is given by
_ ht = iHt ￿ ￿Hht; (34)
_ kt = it ￿ ￿Kkt; (35)
14where
iHt = AH (lHtht)
" (sHtkt)
1￿" ; (36)
while physical capital investment is simply allocated out of goods output yt
without additional adjustment costs:
it = yt ￿ ct: (37)
Since the goods and bank sectors are decentralized, and given the real
wage and real capital rental rate of wt and rt; the agent receives income from
goods and banking labor, (lGt + lkt)wtht; and capital income sGtrtkt: It is
assumed again that there is only one tax in the economy, the proportional
capital income tax ￿k: This makes the capital taxes that are paid by the
agent equal to (1 ￿ ￿k)aktsGtrtkt:
The agent again pays a proportional fee pkt to the bank for the tax evasion
services. The quantity of tax evasion services that the agent buys, denoted
by ￿kt; is equal to the dollars of unreported capital income, (1 ￿ akt)sGtrtkt.
Thus the unreported capital income received by the agent is equal to
(1 ￿ pkt)(1 ￿ akt)sGtrtkt. And since the representative agent owns the
bank, according to the deposits of capital income placed in the bank, there
are also dividends paid to the agent equal to dktrkt; where dkt is again the
quantity of deposited funds, and rkt is the dividend yield per deposit.
The total income constraint can be written in terms of equations (35) and
(37) as
_ kt = (lGt + lkt)wtht + (1 ￿ ￿k)aktsGtrtkt + (1 ￿ pkt)(1 ￿ akt)sGtrtkt
+rktdkt ￿ ct + vt ￿ ￿Kkt: (38)
An additional constraint speci￿es that the amount of bank deposits are
equal to the capital income from the goods and banking sectors:
sGtrtkt ￿ dkt = 0: (39)
153.1 Goods Producer Problem
Production of goods output, yt; uses a CRS technology in capital, sGtkt; and
e⁄ective labor, lGtht;
yt = AG (lGtht)
￿ (sGtkt)
1￿￿ : (40)
The ￿rm, takes the prices of capital and labor services, rt; and wt; as given,
and maximizes pro￿t by choosing e⁄ective labor and capital inputs
max
flGtht;sGtktg
￿Gt = AG (lGtht)
￿ (sGtkt)
1￿￿ ￿ wtlGtht ￿ rtsGtkt: (41)
First-order conditions imply that
wt = ￿AG (sGtk t)
1￿￿ (lGtht)
￿￿1 ; (42)
rt = (1 ￿ ￿)AG (sGtk t)
￿￿ (lGtht)
￿ : (43)
3.2 Bank Production Problem
Bank pro￿t ￿kt is similar to equation (10), subject to a similar production
function to equation (11). But now, to simplify presentation of the remaining
section of the paper, only labor is used instead of capital as an input along
with deposits. This gives that
max
flktht;dktg
￿kt = pkt￿kt ￿ wtlktht ￿ rktdkt; (44)
subject to
￿kt = Ak (lktht)
!k (dt)
1￿!k ; (45)

















16and substituting the solution for
lktht











￿kt = (1 ￿ akt)sGtrtkt; (48)
and that deposits dkt equal capital income sGtrtkt; it follows that







this is the same solution for 1 ￿ akt as in equation (15) except that now wt
replaces rt. Also, since the CRS banking production property implies that
1 ￿ !k =
rktdkt
pkt (1 ￿ akt)sGtrtkt
; (50)
given that dkt = sGtrtkt; it results as in equation (18) that rkt = pkt (1 ￿ !k)(1 ￿ akt):
3.3 Government
Government revenue is equal to the lump sum transfer of vt :
akt￿krtsGtkt = vt: (51)
3.4 Equilibrium: Growth E⁄ect of Tax
Proposition 1 again results, whereby pkt = ￿k: And the balanced-growth path
equilibrium is again the same is in equation (22) and (26).7 But now when
the tax rate changes, there is an additional e⁄ect on the growth rate, as
compared to that of Proposition 2, since the real interest rate now changes
whereas before it was constant.
With the growth rate equal to gt = rt (1 ￿ ￿k + rkt)￿￿K￿￿; as in equation





@ (1 ￿ ￿k + rkt)
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7In equation (27), wt replaces rt in the solution for 1 ￿ akt.
17The ￿rst term is as in equation (23), rt
@(1￿￿k+rkt)
@￿k = ￿rtakt; except that here
rt is not equal to the constant AG: Substituting this in,
@g
@￿k




The second term (1 ￿ ￿k + rkt) @rt
@￿k is a secondary e⁄ect that is a⁄ected by
human capital as given generally in Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
In this model, the returns to human and physical capital are equal along
the balanced growth path, and in particular are given by





(1 ￿ xt) ￿ ￿H: (53)
The marginal product of e⁄ective labor in human capital production (the






tion (53). The other part of the human capital rate of return is the "capacity
utilization rate" of human capital, or 1￿xt; which is the productive employed
time that is factored by ht:
The capital tax increase drives down the return to both physical and
human capital. Factor realignment in the face of the tax, from more heavily
taxed capital to untaxed e⁄ective labor, causes the capital to e⁄ective labor
ratios to fall across both goods and human capital sectors, as the factor
input ratio rt=wt rises. Employed time stays about the same, with less goods
production using less labor time, but more human capital production using
more human capital investment time. The upshot is an increase in rt:
However, the e⁄ect on rt is of secondary order in terms of magnitude, as
compared to the ￿rst term of equation (52). And the fraction of reported
income akt determines this e⁄ect, as in Proposition 2, and again akt is the
determinate of changes in the price elasticity of demand for the reported
income, since the elasticity equations (28) and (29) still hold in this economy.
Since rt does increase as a result of the tax, the growth e⁄ect of the tax
is somewhat less in this economy as compared to the Section 2 Ak economy.
But the nonlinearity e⁄ect of the tax evasion is only slightly a⁄ected. If the
productivity of the bank sector is set to zero, so that Ak = 0, akt = 1 and
18rkt = 0; then the growth e⁄ect is
@g
@￿k




and the economy returns to the standard tax e⁄ect analysis of Stokey and
Rebelo (1996). Simulations give the same general shape of the capital tax -
growth pro￿le as in Figure 2; with Ak > 0 and some degree of tax evasion,
the tax-growth pro￿le is nonlinear with the marginal e⁄ect on growth smaller
as the tax rate increases (see Section 4.4).
4 Extensions to other Taxes
Consider how tax evasion would a⁄ect the response of the growth rate to a
labor tax increase. To focus on this, ￿rst an Ah economy with only human
capital is presented, in which there is a tax only on labor. Then this labor
tax is imposed along with the capital tax in the economy with human and
physical capital. And ￿nally in this latter setting, a goods tax, or value-added
tax, is also imposed.
4.1 Labor Tax, Evasion, and Only Human Capital
Similar to the Ak economy of Section 2, the Ah economy has an analytic
solution for the e⁄ect of the tax on the growth rate when tax evasion is
produced in the banking sector. The consumer has the same utility as in the
Section 3 economy, of equation (31). Time is allocated between the three
sectors, similar to equation (32), but now with time also used to produce
banking, lkt :
lGt + lHt + lkt + xt = 1: (55)
Goods production is linear in the e⁄ective time lGtht :
yt = AGlGtht: (56)
And human capital investment is also linear in e⁄ective time, as in Lucas
(1988), in a no-physical-capital modi￿cation of equation (36):
19iHt = AHlHtht: (57)
The human capital accumulation equation (34) again applies.
The tax rate on labor income is denoted by ￿l; and the fraction of income
that the consumer reports to the government is denoted by alt: The bank
fee paid for the tax evasion service is plt; and the dividend rate received
from depositing labor income in the tax evasion bank is denoted by rlt: The
quantity of deposits in the bank, denoted by dlt is the labor income from
goods and banking production, or wt (lGt + llt)ht: And for the fraction of
income, (1 ￿ alt)wt (lGt + llt)ht; upon which the consumer evades taxes, the
total fees paid are plt (1 ￿ alt)wt (lGt + llt)ht: With additional income of the
government tax lump sum transfer vt; and the expenditure on consumption
of ct; the consumer budget constraint, instead of equation (38) of the last
section, is now:
(1 ￿ ￿l)altwt (lGt + llt)ht+(1 ￿ plt)(1 ￿ alt)wt (lGt + llt)ht+rltdlt+vt￿ct = 0:
(58)
The additional constraint on the consumer problem, instead of equation (39),
is that the deposits in the bank equal the labor income deposited:
dlt = wt (lGt + llt)ht: (59)




￿Gt = AG (lGtht) ￿ wtlGtht; (60)
so that in equilibrium,
wt = AG: (61)
The government budget constraint, similar to equation (19), is
alt￿lwt (lGt + llt)ht = vt: (62)
The bank supplying the tax evasion service, in a fashion similar to equa-
tion (44), maximizes pro￿t
max
fllthtg
￿lt = plt￿lt ￿ wtlltht ￿ rltdlt; (63)
20subject to the production function:
￿lt = Al (lltht)
!l (dlt)
1￿!l ; (64)










Solving for 1 ￿ alt; similar to equation (15), it results that







In equilibrium, the consumer maximizes utility subject to the human
capital investment, income and deposit constraints, of equations (34), (57),
(58) and (59). It results as in Proposition 1 that
plt = ￿l: (67)
The price of the tax evasion service is the labor tax rate, so that the supply
of laundered income is equal to







which can be graphed as in Figure 1. The dividend rate is given by
rlt = ￿l (1 ￿ !l)(1 ￿ alt);
and the growth rate is given by
gt = AH(1 ￿ xt) ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿; (69)
where AH (1 ￿ xt) ￿ ￿K is the return on human capital, a simpli￿ed return
as compared to that in equation (53) because of the lack of physical capital.
Growth rate e⁄ects of the tax are less apparent in equation (69), compared
to the Ak economy￿ s equation (22). The labor tax acts on growth through
its e⁄ect on leisure xt: The marginal rate of substitution between goods and






(1 ￿ ￿l + rlt)wtht
: (70)
The e⁄ective tax rate is equal to ￿l￿rlt; similar to Corollary 1. A tax increase
lowers the shadow price of leisure and causes substitution from goods to
leisure. The increase in leisure causes the growth rate to fall.
Substituting the equilibrium leisure into the growth rate equation (69),
the result is that the growth rate falls by less as the tax rate increases, now
that there is tax evasion; Figure 3 illustrates this.8 The economy with no


















Figure 3: The E⁄ect on Growth of the Labor Tax ￿l with Tax Evasion
tax evasion (dashed line) indicates that the growth rate falls at an increasing
rate as the labor tax increases. With tax evasion, there is a diminished fall
in the growth rate at all tax rate levels, with the growth rate decrease being
of a diminishing magnitude at higher tax rates, as was found for the capital
tax in Section 2.
The price elasticity of the demand for the reported income, per unit of
human capital rises in magnitude as the tax rate rises. This can be seen by



















#: With Al = 0; and no tax evasion, then x =
￿￿







: Parameters assumed in Figure
3 are AH ￿ ￿K = 0:12; ￿ = 0:02; ￿ = 3; !l = 0:3; AG = 0:19; and Al = 0:7:
22taking the quantity of reported income, per unit of human capital, which








then using the fact that in this economy lGt + llt =
￿
AH; 9 and wt = AG; to






1￿!l; this is similar to
equation (28) of the Ak economy. By using the solution for alt in equation
(68), this shows that the price elasticity of demand for the normalized re-
ported income rises in magnitude as the tax rate increases, while at the same
time the decrease in the growth rate becomes less.
4.2 Labor and Capital Taxes in the Full Economy
Placing both labor and capital taxes within the Section 3 economy, with both
human and physical capital, shows that the principle of a rising price elas-
ticity and a lesser growth rate decrease holds for both taxes simultaneously
in this extended setting. The simplest way to present this economy is to
allow for two separate banks, one that processes capital income and one that
processes labor income. The Sections 3 and 4 assumptions are maintained
that only labor and deposits are used both in the capital income processing
bank and in the labor income processing bank.
With the same utility function, the consumer￿ s budget constraint is now:
_ kt = alt (1 ￿ ￿l)wt (lGt + lkt + llt)ht + (1 ￿ alt)(1 ￿ plt)wt (lGt + lkt + llt)ht
+rltdlt + akt (1 ￿ ￿k)rtsGtkt + (1 ￿ akt)(1 ￿ pkt)rtsGtkt + rktdkt
￿ct + vt ￿ ￿Kkt: (71)
And the deposit constraints are that
dkt = rtsGtkt;
dlt = wt (lGt + lkt + llt)ht:
9This is found by dividing iHt in equation (57) by ht; which equals gt on the balanced-
growth path, and setting this equal to gt of equation (69).
23The government budget constraint now is
akt￿krtsGtkt + alt￿lwt (lGt + lkt + llt)ht = vt: (72)
The same human capital technology as in Section 3 applies (equation 36).
Then the growth rate equation is again the same as in equation (22), and
the equality of the returns to physical and human capital is given by equa-
tion (53). And now a labor tax a⁄ects leisure, which a⁄ects growth mainly
through the tax e⁄ect on leisure that determines the return to human capital
in equation (53). The labor tax also has a secondary order e⁄ect on the real
interest rate in the general equilibrium. Similarly the capital tax￿ s primary
e⁄ect is on the return to physical capital, with a secondary e⁄ect on leisure
and the return to human capital.
Simulations for the e⁄ects of the capital and labor tax indicate the same
shapes as in Figures 2 and 3: a more non-linear pro￿le when there is tax
evasion versus the more linear pro￿le when Ak = Al = 0 and there is no tax
evasion (see Section 4.4).
4.3 Adding a VAT Tax
Finally, consider additionally adding a VAT goods tax and again a separate
bank for the goods tax evasion. This is presented within the full economy
with both physical and human capital, and with both capital and labor taxes
and their evasions, as well, as in the last subsection. The results are a simple
extension of those results already obtained for the capital and labor taxes.
To see this, let there be a proportional tax on the sales of goods purchases,
denoted by ￿c; similar to a value-added tax (VAT). Then the cost of buying
goods is now (1 + ￿c)ct if all of the sales are reported to the government.
Typically in the representative agent growth model without exchange we
consider the goods to be bought and sold from the producer, rather than
adding the layer of stores that sell the goods. Here, think of the consumer
as owning the stores that distribute the goods. Then when there is a tax on
sales, the consumer has to pay the tax when buying the good, and the store
owner then has to report the total sales and receipts to the government. By
buying tax evasion banking services, at a per dollar price of pct; the consumer
24is able to pay sales taxes on only a portion of the goods, and can evade taxes
on the rest. This is similar to the practice of paying a lower price for some
purchases because it is understood that the sale is "under-the-counter", will
not be reported for tax accounting, and so will not include the tax in the
price.
Let act be the fraction of goods purchases that are reported to the gov-
ernment and 1 ￿ act the fraction that is unreported. The bank providing
the goods tax evasion is owned by the consumer according to the amount of
deposits made in the bank. The deposits, dct; are equal to the amount of
consumption sales ct :
dct = ct; (73)
and the consumer receives a dividend per deposit as denoted by rct: The
quantity of the tax evasion services being demanded are given by ￿ct =
(1 ￿ act)ct: Therefore the total fee paid for the services is pct (1 ￿ act)ct:
In producing the bank VAT evasion services, it is again assumed that
only e⁄ective labor and deposits are inputs. The consumer spends additional
labor time lct working for this new bank, and now instead of equation (71),
the consumer budget constraint is:
_ kt = alt (1 ￿ ￿l)wt (lGt + lkt + llt + lct)ht + akt (1 ￿ ￿k)rtsGtkt
+(1 ￿ alt)(1 ￿ plt)wt (lGt + lkt + llt + lct)ht
+(1 ￿ akt)(1 ￿ pkt)rtsGtkt ￿ (1 + ￿c)actct ￿ (1 + pct)(1 ￿ act)ct
+rltdlt + rktdkt + rctdct + vt ￿ ￿Kkt: (74)
The consumer problem is as in the previous section except that now
the budget constraint is equation (74), and there is an additional deposit
constraint given by equation (73). The goods producer problem is the same,
and the bank problems are the same for the banks providing the capital and




￿ct = pct￿ct ￿ wtlctht ￿ rctdct; (75)
25subject to the production function:
￿ct = Ac (lctht)
!c (dct)
1￿!c ; (76)
with !c 2 (0;1): In equilibrium,







And the government budget constraint becomes
akt￿krtsGtkt + alt￿lwt (lGt + lkt + llt + lct)ht + ￿cactct = vt: (78)
The consumer equilibrium conditions imply the equivalence between the
VAT rate and the price of evasion services:
pct = ￿c;
and the dividend return is
rct = ￿ct (1 ￿ !c)(1 ￿ act): (79)





1 + ￿c ￿ rct
(1 ￿ ￿l + rlt)wh
; (80)
which di⁄ers from equation (70) by the addition of the e⁄ective VAT tax rate
in the numerator of ￿c ￿ rct: The equality of returns of human and physical
capital along the balanced-growth path is again given by equation (53), and
the growth rate by equation (22).
The e⁄ect of the VAT of course is to reinforce the goods to leisure sub-
stitution that the labor tax also induces. Thus the growth e⁄ect of the tax
again works mainly through its e⁄ect on the amount of leisure taken, just
as with the labor tax. Simulations indicate that the growth rate falls at a
decreasing rate as the VAT rises, and that there is a less nonlinear pro￿le
when Ac = 0 and there is no tax evasion service for the VAT (see the next
subsection).
264.4 Simulations
This section shows the simulated pro￿le of the tax rate on the growth rate in
each of four cases. Besides the three taxes on capital income, labor income,
and the goods VAT tax, as described in this section, a monetary extension is
made whereby the in￿ ation tax is added and avoided through an additional
bank sector that produces credit with the same technology as that used to
evade the other taxes. This credit economy is found in Benk, Gillman, and
Kejak (2008).10
An illustrative calibration sets standard values for parameters: the share
of capital in the goods and human capital sectors, ￿ = " = 0:36; physical
and human capital depreciation rates, ￿K = ￿H = 0:05, the discount rate,
￿ = 0:04 and log-utility: Given a growth rate of the economy of g = 0:02;
the weight of leisure in utility function set at ￿ = 1:9; and with productivity
parameters of AG = 1:5, and AH = 0:233; leisure is x = 0:6.
The labor shares in the bank sectors for evading the capital, labor and
VAT taxes are !k = !l = !c = 0:3 and the productivity parameters are
assumed to be Ak = Al = Ac = 1: For in￿ ation tax avoidance through credit
use, the comparable "omega" labor share in credit production, call it !D; is
set at 0:2; and the comparable bank productivity factor is set at AD = 0:77:
The tax rates, when they are not varying in the simulation, are set equal to
￿k = ￿l = ￿c = 0:15: The money growth rate, ￿; is set at 0:07, when not
varying, giving an in￿ ation rate of ￿ = 0:05; variation in ￿ is used in Figure
4 (panel a) to show the e⁄ect of the in￿ ation tax on growth.
Figure 4 shows the tax-growth pro￿le for a range of tax rates for each of
the four taxes (panels a,b,c, and d), when there is tax evasion or avoidance.
The dashed line shows how the pro￿le shifts down as the bank productivity
goes down (by 10% of its initial value). When increasing any of the given
taxes, the decrease in the growth rate is smaller (solid lines) than when there
is no tax evasion (not shown) or the tax evasion is less productive (dashed
lines).
10In Benk et al (2008), there are no labor or capital taxes, and there are stochastic
shocks.



































































































Figure 4: Growth E⁄ect Across Di⁄erent Taxes; Bank Productivity Decrease
5 Conclusion
The paper postulates a principle of public ￿nance for the e⁄ect of taxes on
endogenous growth when tax evasion is allowed. This is developed most
simply within an Ak economy, with only a capital income tax, and then
extended to labor income and goods sales taxes. And the results are parallel
to those in Gillman and Kejak (2005) for the in￿ ation tax. The tax evasion
allows for the e⁄ective tax rate to be decreased. As the tax rises, the elasticity
of substitution between reporting the income and not reporting the income
rises; and the price elasticity of demand for the reported income with respect
to the tax also increases in magnitude. This substitution away from reporting
the income (or sales) causes the e⁄ective tax rate to fall as the tax rate rises.
As a result, tax evasion causes the growth rate to fall by marginally less for
marginally higher tax rates, as compared to no tax evasion.
The model developed to generate these results does not rely on preferences
for evasion. Rather a competitive banking sector is speci￿ed that produces
the tax evasion service at a competitively determined price. In equilibrium,
this proportional tax evasion fee equals the tax rate, a traditional result
whereby the consumer is willing to spend on the margin an amount equal to
28the cost of the tax. The result follows from using a micro-founded produc-
tion function for the banking sector as found in the ￿nancial intermediation
services literature starting with Sealey and Lindley (1977), Clark (1984) and
Hancock (1985), and now established as the dominant approach in the bank-
ing.11 While convex cost functions are sometimes assumed to establish the
banking service equilibrium (Berk and Green 2004), here the general equi-
librium incorporation of the intermediation approach gives such an upward
sloping marginal cost of evasion per dollar unit, as in Figure 1, and provides
the basis of the paper￿ s results.12
The tax evasion model here extends the famous Baumol (1952) exchange
trade-o⁄, whereby the marginal cost of avoiding money use through banking
is equal to the nominal interest rate (which is the in￿ ation tax rate given
an optimum of a zero nominal interest rate). Adding tax evasion in a non-
monetary context, with the marginal cost of evasion equal to the tax rate,
results in an intuitively plausible nonlinear tax-growth pro￿le for each tax.
And the reasons for this are plausible as well, a rising price elasticity to the
taxed good as the tax rate rises. However, while such a tax-growth pro￿le has
empirical support with respect to the in￿ ation tax, the empirics of the tax-
growth pro￿les remains to be investigated for the capital, labor and goods
taxes, a topic for future research.
A major quali￿cation is that the analysis is a positive one about growth
rate e⁄ects, with interesting normative questions, on the optimal structure of
taxes in this environment, left for future research. Conditions can be stated
by which welfare is lower, in the Section 2 Ak and Section 4.1 Ah economies,
given that there is tax evasion (Ak > 0; Al > 0) and there are low tax rates,
even though the growth rate is higher; but welfare can also be higher with tax
evasion at su¢ ciently high taxes. And examining welfare in the full economy
with human and physical capital also requires consideration of transitional
dynamics, when the tax rate changes. Second-best Ramsey considerations
also remain for future work.
11According to Matthews and Thompson (2008); see for example Berger and Mester
(1997).
12If deposits are not used as an input, and only labor or capital are inputs, then no
unique equilibrium exists; see Proposition 1, Gillman, Harris, and Kejak (2007).
29Other quali￿cations are clear: tax evasion causes less tax collection and
so can force greater reliance on less e¢ cient taxes that result in lower growth
in the end. And evasion activity induces an income loss from the using up of
real resources, the amount of which depends on the productivity of banking.
And bank veri￿cation and asymmetric information issues are here captured
abstractly with the productivity parameter in the bank production. But
abstracting from informational issues and the complications of the optimal
amount of enforcement to keep evasion under control, itself a subject for full
inquiry (Ehrlich 1996, Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 2006), the point here
is that we can see formally how competitive evasion activity, with a lump
sum return of government revenue, lowers the e⁄ective tax rate, increases
the price elasticity of demand for the declared income, and increases growth.
And with evasion, a decrease in the tax rate results in a bigger marginal
increase in growth, the lower is the initial tax rate.
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